We investigate whether earnings guidance affects aggregate stock returns through its effects on expectations about overall earnings performance and/or aggregate expected returns. We find that aggregate guidance, especially relative levels of quarterly downward guidance, is associated with analyst-and time-series-based measures of aggregate earnings news. We find more modest evidence that guidance, again, largely downward guidance, is associated with market returnsmarket returns appear to respond to guidance toward the end of each calendar quarter, when most earnings preannouncements are released, and there is some evidence that firm-level guidance affects market returns in short windows around its release.
Introduction
Earnings guidance is now pervasive, with thousands of management earnings forecasts released every year. As a result, stock market commentators sometimes discuss the implications of trends in earnings guidance for market returns, including the relative number of negative earnings preannouncements ("earnings warnings") in a quarter. The implication is that earnings guidance is informative with respect to overall earnings trends in the economy, and perhaps even for trends in macroeconomic variables such as industrial production and GDP growth, and so affects market returns. 1 We investigate whether aggregate earnings guidance affects aggregate stock returns. The argument is not simply that because guidance is informative at the firm level it will also be informative at the market level. Whether aggregate guidance affects market returns depends on its effects on both the numerator and denominator of aggregate stock market valuations; that is, on whether it affects: (1) investors' estimates of aggregate expected future cash flows, and/or (2) expected returns. With respect to cash flows, the informativeness of guidance depends on the extent to which earnings guidance, when aggregated across firms, captures overall earnings news; this will depend on whether guidance is pervasive and/or representative. Because managers tend to issue guidance when their firms are performing unusually well or poorly, it is not obvious that aggregate guidance, even if pervasive, is informative about economy-wide earnings. For example, if managers strategically disclose good and bad news in different ways, ., " Financial Times, p. 27, October 13, 2003 . Many of these articles cite Chuck Hill, until recently director of research at Thomson First Call. Thomson First Call produces a weekly earnings report ("This Week in Earnings") which reports, among other statistics, summary data on the ratio of negative to positive preannouncements. The report for 23 January 2004 indicated that "The 1Q04 pre-announcements are now up to meaningful levels with 198 total to date. The ratio of negative to positive pre-announcements is at a very low 1.4, well below the 1.9 at the same date for 1Q03, and even further below the 2.3 average over the last nine years." aggregate guidance will not capture aggregate earnings news.
2 On the other hand, guidance may be informative even if it is only issued by a relatively small number of "bellwether" firms if these firms' earnings are informative about the economy as a whole. Finally, for aggregate guidance to be informative, it must be that it aggregates firm-level news in such a way that it leads rather than lags macroeconomic news.
Guidance can also affect market-level expected returns. Evidence in finance suggests that variation in firm-level stock returns is driven primarily by cash flow news while variation in market-level returns is driven primarily by shocks to expected returns. The argument is that firms' earnings news is largely idiosyncratic and diversifies away upon aggregation while expected returns are driven by macro factors that are not diversifiable (Campbell, 1991; Vuolteenaho, 2002) . Aggregate guidance will affect market-level expected returns if it affects investors' expectations about macroeconomic activity, which in turn affect expected returns (e.g., Fama and French, 1989; Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner, 2005) . Guidance can also affect levels of market uncertainty -if the arrival of earnings news increases market uncertainty, the associated increase in return volatility will increase expected returns, reducing stock prices.
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There is little research on the relation between firm-level earnings news and market-wide earnings aggregates or returns. Penman (1987) finds systematic variation in aggregate earnings news within calendar years and links this to variation in aggregate returns. Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2005) investigate a number of properties of aggregate earnings news and its relation to market returns and find, among other things, that market returns are negatively related to aggregate earnings growth.
We use an extensive database of management-issued earnings guidance from Thomson First Call to investigate our predictions. Consistent with previous research, we find that the majority of earnings guidance is quarterly and that over half of all quarterly guidance is downward guidance with the remainder equally divided between upward and neutral guidance.
We confirm previous evidence that quarterly guidance, especially downward guidance, is more informative than other types of guidance for firm-level returns. We also find that the relative extent of downward guidance (measured by the ratio of downward to upward guidance) varies a good deal from one quarter to the next, and varies more than corresponding aggregate annual guidance measures. This evidence suggests that the relative extent of quarterly downward guidance, in particular, is potentially informative about economic aggregates. 4 Our evidence indicates that guidance is increasingly pervasive and representative. We find that there has been a substantial increase in guidance over the 1994 to 2003 sample period, with the proportion of firms issuing guidance increasing from less than 10% in the mid-1990s to around 25% in [2001] [2002] [2003] , and that firms issuing guidance now represent approximately 45% of
Compustat on a value-weighted basis, up from 10-15% in the mid-1990s.
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The intra-quarter timing of guidance varies as a function of the earnings news in a systematic way. In relative terms, managers tend to issue neutral guidance early in the quarter, downward guidance toward the end of the quarter, and upward guidance after the end of the 4 The preponderance of negative forecast disclosures is well known (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995) . If managers have stronger incentives to disclose bad news than good news, aggregate guidance is less likely to be informative. However, if these incentives are relatively constant from one quarter to the next, rational market participants will infer the market's overall earnings news from the relative extent of downward guidance: when the relative quantity of downward guidance in a quarter is low, the market will infer that the overall earnings news is good and vice versa. 5 The value-weighted proportions increase to over 50% if we include all firms that issue earnings guidance, as opposed to just those included in our final sample. These increases may be overstated if the completeness of First Call's coverage of earnings guidance has improved over time; see Section 3 and the Appendix.
quarter. We also find that the information content of guidance increases as the quarter progresses.
Our main tests assess whether aggregate measures of quarterly earnings guidance capture overall earnings news and drive market returns. Using quarterly data, we find that guidance measures, especially the relative extent of downward guidance, are associated with other measures of aggregate earnings news such as analyst forecast-and time series-based measures of earnings news. This suggests that aggregate guidance captures aggregate earnings news.
However, there is no evidence of a relation between these guidance measures and quarterly market returns.
When we use monthly data there is some weak evidence that aggregate guidance is related to market returns. We find that increases in the extent of downward (upward) guidance are negatively (positively) related to market returns. The timing of these correlations implies, however, that returns lead guidance rather than the other way around, suggesting that macroeconomic news drives both guidance and returns.
We find different patterns of intra-quarter market returns in good news and bad news quarters. Positive market returns in good news quarters accrue smoothly over the entire period while negative market returns in bad news quarters are concentrated in the last few weeks of the quarter. These patterns are consistent with guidance being informative because the relative extent of downward guidance increases noticeably in the last few weeks of bad news quarters but not in good news quarters.
Finally, we find that earnings guidance issued by the largest firms ("bellwethers") is associated with market returns in short event windows around its release, consistent with earnings guidance being informative at the market level, at least for certain large firms.
The argument motivating our research is that aggregate earnings guidance is a leading indicator of the economic news that drives aggregate stock returns. While we provide some evidence of an association between guidance and market returns, the direction of causality is less clear. Some of our evidence suggests that macroeconomic shocks drive both market returns and firm-level earnings news, which then cause managers to issue guidance.
Section 2 discusses our predictions in more detail. Section 3 describes sample selection and provides descriptive information. Section 4 reports our results. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Predictions
Our principal research question is whether aggregate earnings guidance affects aggregate stock market returns. We discuss the links between earnings guidance and expectations about future cash flows and expected returns in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.
Earnings guidance and expected future cash flows
To the extent that earnings guidance provides information about individual firms' expected future cash flows, we expect that aggregate guidance provides information about the expected future cash flows of firms in general, and thus for the market as a whole. 6 The more firms that issue earnings guidance, the more likely it is to have implications for the market as a whole. Thus, we expect that the extent to which guidance is informative for the market as a whole will increase with the pervasiveness of the guidance.
Whether earnings guidance is a useful indicator of market-wide earnings also depends on whether it is representative. Previous evidence shows that firms that issue earnings guidance tend to be larger and more profitable than other firms (e.g., Patell, 1976; Lev and Penman, 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 1993) , that managers tend to provide guidance when they have adverse earnings news (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995) , and more generally that managers' disclosure strategies vary as a function of their firms' earnings news (Soffer et al., 2000; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2005) . This implies that guidance may not be representative of the earnings performance of firms in general.
The informativeness of earnings guidance also depends on its timing -the earlier in the quarter guidance becomes available, the more likely it is to drive market-wide earnings expectations. However, if managers strategically time the release of guidance to generate particular stock price effects, the market's response will be conditioned accordingly.
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For example, if bad news forecasts tend to precede good news forecasts each quarter, the market will respond to the relative extent of good and bad news forecasts; an unusually small number of bad news forecasts will convey good news and vice versa. Consequently, we also provide evidence on the timing of earnings guidance.
Even if guidance is not pervasive, there may be a small number of firms whose results are representative of those for the market as a whole and which therefore have a disproportionate effect on market-wide earnings expectations. The press sometimes discusses the earnings guidance of "bellwether" firms such as Intel or GE. 8 Recent evidence shows that the distribution 7 See, for example, Skinner (1994 Skinner ( , 1997 , Soffer et al. (2000) , Graham et al. (2005) . See also Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2005) who argue that managers tend to leak good earnings news early and in advance of bad news, which therefore generates a larger stock price reaction once it is revealed. Bad news is withheld in the hopes that there will be offsetting good news. 8 
Earnings guidance and expected returns
Evidence in finance suggests that information about expected returns explains most of the variation in market returns (Campbell, 1991) while cash flow news explains most of the variation in firm-level returns (Vuolteenaho, 2002) . These papers argue that because firm-level earnings news is largely idiosyncratic, its effects diversify away when aggregated. In contrast, variation in expected returns is predominantly driven by systematic macro factors that are not diversifiable. The implication is that earnings guidance will not affect market-level expected future cash flows, leaving only the link to expected returns.
Earnings guidance could affect market-level expected returns in two ways. First, macroeconomic activity is positively related to current corporate earnings news (e.g., Lucas, 1977) and negatively related to expected returns (e.g., Fama and French, 1989; Cochrane, 1991) .
This implies that current earnings news is negatively related to expected returns (this means, for example, that good earnings news lowers expected returns, causing stock prices to increase). Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2005) find, however, that aggregate quarterly earnings news is negatively related to quarterly market returns.
Second, earnings guidance potentially affects levels of market uncertainty. The argument is that increased market uncertainty increases the volatility of market returns, and that these volatility shocks are persistent, which increases expected returns and drives down stock returns (e.g., French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987; Schwert, 1989) . Campbell and Hentschel (1992) discuss a related "volatility feedback effect," under which an information shock increases volatility by increasing uncertainty. 10 Good news naturally increases stock prices, but this effect is offset by an accompanying increase in uncertainty, volatility and expected returns, muting the overall effect on prices. Bad news, on the other hand, causes stock prices to decline, an effect that is reinforced by the accompanying increase in uncertainty, volatility and expected returns.
Thus, volatility feedback causes an asymmetric response to earnings news. This effect is related to the leverage effect in stock returns -the fact that stock return volatility increases as stock prices decline. See, for example, Black (1976) or Christie (1982) . 11 Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002) document such an effect at the firm level. 12 On the last point, we require that a quarterly management forecast is made before the earnings announcement date of the fiscal quarter being forecast and no more than 90 days before the end of that fiscal quarter. For annual forecasts we require that the forecast is made before the earnings announcement date of the fiscal year being forecast and no more than 730 days (two years) before the end of that fiscal year. This means that annual forecasts can be made no earlier than the beginning of the fiscal year that precedes that being forecast. With regard to the corresponding analysts' forecasts, we require that a consensus analysts earnings forecast is available at least 5 and no more than 90 days before the corresponding quarterly management forecast, and at most 120 days before the fiscal quarter end. For annual forecasts, we require that: (1) if the management forecast is released in the same fiscal year, the consensus analyst forecast be available at least 5 and no more than 120 days before the management earnings forecasts, or (2) if the management forecast is released in the fiscal year prior to that being forecast, there is no restriction. With regard to the Compustat earnings announcement date requirement, we also drop a small number aggregate earnings guidance by calendar quarter, we require sample firms to have fiscal quarters that coincide with calendar quarters. The final sample contains 31,230 management earnings forecasts.
A large number of sample forecasts are "multiple forecasts" that occur when a firm issues more than one forecast for a given fiscal period (see also Ajinkya et al., 2005) . As shown in Table 1 , removing these observations reduces the sample of annual forecasts by about threequarters, to only 3,192 observations, because many firms issue multiple forecasts for a given fiscal year. The effect is less pronounced for quarterly forecasts, where the sample is reduced by about one-quarter, to 12,695 observations. 13 We retain the last forecast for firm/periods with multiple forecasts, which reduces the sample to 6,255 annual forecasts (44% of the original sample) and 14,747 quarterly forecasts (87% of the original sample). We obtain similar results if we retain the multiple forecasts. Table 2 reports the number of forecasts by year, in total and by reporting period (annual versus quarterly), along with the number of forecasts issued in conjunction with earnings announcements, the number of firms releasing forecasts in each year, and the relative frequency and size of forecasting firms. The number of forecasts and forecasting firms increases over the sample period, consistent with an increasing propensity to issue earnings guidance. These numbers increase steadily from 1994 though 1997 but show a large jump in 1998, possibly reflecting more comprehensive coverage by First Call. 14 The number of forecasts continues to of observations for which the earnings announcement date is clearly in error given the fiscal period for which the forecast is being made. 13 About half (51%) of the total sample of firm/years with annual forecasts are cases where the firm makes a single forecast for the fiscal year, 18% of firm/years are cases where firms issue two forecasts for a given year, 11% of firm/years have three forecasts for the year, 8% of firm/years have four forecasts for the year, and the remaining 12% of firm/years have five or more forecasts for the year. In contrast, 86% of firm/quarters with quarterly forecasts are cases where the firm issues only one forecast for the quarter while 12% of firm/quarters have two forecasts. 14 The evolution of First Call as a provider of management earnings forecasts is described in the appendix. 
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The table shows a pronounced increase over the sample period in the number of forecasts issued in conjunction with earnings announcements, a phenomenon first analyzed by Hoskin, Hughes, and Ricks (1986) and Waymire (1984) . 16 Less than 10% of quarterly forecasts were The proportions are always higher for annual forecasts than quarterly forecasts. Possible explanations include an increasing emphasis by First Call on collecting forecasts that occur at earnings announcements (although it is not clear why this tendency would increase steadily over the sample period), an effect of Reg FD, and/or some interaction between these factors. 17 When we reperform our analyses separately for the set of forecasts released in conjunction with earnings announcements we find no noticeable difference in the results. Table 2 reports evidence on the fraction of Compustat firms that issue earnings guidance each year, both as a simple proportion and after value-weighting using total assets and market value of equity. We define forecasting firms as those that issue any type of earnings guidance during the year (at least one annual or quarterly forecast for that year) and divide this number by the total number of firms on Compustat in that year. The proportion of firms issuing guidance increases steadily during the sample period, from around 5-10% in the mid 1990s to around 25%
in [2001] [2002] [2003] . Earnings guidance is more pervasive when we value-weight the observations, as expected given the tendency for larger firms to provide more guidance. The market valueweighted proportion of forecasters increases from 14% in 1995 to 46% in 2003. 18 Overall, these findings suggest that earnings guidance is now provided consistently by a set of relatively large firms that collectively account for about one-half of the market on a valueweighted basis, supporting the idea that earnings guidance is both pervasive and representative.
19 Table 3 reports on the stock price reaction to management earnings forecasts. We compute market-adjusted returns for the three trading day window centered on the date of the management earnings forecast. 20 We use the last forecast observation for periods with multiple forecasts. We divide forecasts into those that convey downward, upward, and neutral guidance by either (in the case of quantitative forecasts) comparing the management forecast to the most recent median analysts' forecast available from First Call or (in the case of qualitative forecasts)
using information provided about the forecast by First Call.
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The results in Table 3 are largely in accord with previous research (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Hutton et al., 2003; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2005) . For the overall sample, the mean (median) abnormal return is -3.0% (-1.2%) and 58% of the returns are negative. The central tendency is negative because most forecasts (63%) are of quarterly earnings, which are more likely to convey bad news, and because bad news forecasts are more informative. The information content of both good and bad news forecasts is larger for quarterly forecasts than for annual forecasts, with means (medians) of 4.3% (2.7%) and -9.1% (-6.0%) for quarterly forecasts of good and bad news, respectively, compared to corresponding means (medians) of 2.3%
(1.5%) and -4.5% (-2.4%) for annual forecasts. Returns associated with neutral forecasts are close to zero. 22 The fact that forecasts of quarterly earnings are more informative suggests that aggregate quarterly guidance is likely to be more informative than aggregate annual guidance.
To assess forecast timing, we classify forecasts of quarterly earnings into four subperiods, shown in Figure 2: (1) the period from the end of the previous fiscal quarter to 50 calendar days before the end of the fiscal quarter; (2) the period from 50 days before the end of the fiscal quarter to 25 days before the end of that quarter; (3) the period from 25 days before the end of the fiscal quarter to the end of the quarter; and (4) the period from the end of the fiscal quarter to the earnings announcement date. We report on the information content of the three types of guidance by subperiod in Table 3 , Panel B.
The results show that the timing of forecasts is related to their information content -the average reaction to these forecasts becomes increasingly negative during the quarter, with average reactions of -4.07%, -4.69%, and -6.89% for subperiods 1, 2, and 3 (the medians show a similar pattern). This occurs because: (1) the proportion of downward guidance increases during the quarter (from .44 in subperiod 1 to .49 in subperiod 2 and to .63 in subperiod 3), (2) the response to downward guidance tends to be increasingly negative during the quarter (this is true of the medians; the means are -10.45%, -9.59%, and -11.42%), and (3) the response to neutral guidance also becomes more negative during the quarter (the means are -0.53%, -1.70%, and -2.35% in subperiods 1 to 3, respectively). The reaction to upward guidance also tends to increase during the quarter, but not by enough to offset the effect of the downward and neutral guidance. This evidence supports the idea that the relative extent of downward guidance late in the fiscal quarter is potentially informative about overall quarterly earnings news. Figure 3 shows the timing of the three types of earnings guidance during the quarter. The intra-quarter timing of guidance varies with the earnings news. Relatively more neutral news is released at the beginning of the quarter while relatively more negative news and relatively less positive or neutral news is released in the last part of the quarter. This tendency reverses after the end of the quarter when relatively more positive news is released: over half of the positive news is released after the end of the quarter. This evidence also suggests that investors should have a good idea by the end of the forecast quarter of the overall extent of bad news, and hence of earnings news overall.
Aggregate Earnings Guidance, Aggregate Earnings News, and Market Returns.
Section 3 reports a number of regularities that support our contention that aggregate guidance, especially the relative extent of quarterly downward guidance, is potentially informative about aggregate earnings and market returns. In this section we investigate these questions more directly using quarterly and monthly data on aggregate earnings news and market returns (Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively). We also present evidence on the relation between intra-quarter patterns in earnings guidance and market returns in good and bad news quarters (Section 4.3) and of short-window market returns around the time that large firms (a proxy for market "bellwethers") release earnings guidance (Section 4.4).
Quarterly data
To provide evidence on trends in aggregate guidance, Figure 4 plots the ratio of downward guidance to upward guidance for each quarter in the sample period. We calculate these ratios separately for annual and quarterly guidance. Figure 4 shows that there is a good deal of quarter-to-quarter variation in the relative extent of downward and upward guidance, especially for quarterly forecasts. The ratio of downward to upward guidance formed using annual forecasts (the "annual guidance ratio") typically varies between 1 and 2, with a mean of 1.3 and a standard deviation of .6. In contrast, the quarterly guidance ratio has a mean of 3.0, a standard deviation of 1.2 and never falls below 1.2, and so is both more variable and substantially larger than the annual guidance ratio. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the aggregate guidance variables and market returns measured using the CRSP equal-weighted and S&P 500 market indices. To be consistent with our timing convention (Figure 2) we cumulate returns over the three months beginning with the second month of each calendar quarter, i.e., first quarter returns are cumulated over February, March, and April, etc. This aligns our quarterly return window with the period over which earnings news for a given quarter is typically disclosed and announced.
The guidance variables, ΔD, ΔN, and ΔU, are seasonal changes in the fraction of each quarter's forecasts of quarterly earnings that represent downward, neutral, and upward guidance, respectively. 23 The means of these variables are close to zero and ΔD and ΔU both display some autocorrelation. Ratio is the ratio of downward to upward quarterly guidance for the quarter (as in Figure 4) and in Panel D and the correlations between ΔD and ΔN are around -.7. This makes it difficult to separately interpret the correlations between these variables and the news variables; for example, the fact that earnings news seems to be positively related to ΔN could be driven by opposite and contemporaneous changes in ΔD. 24 It is also not surprising that ΔRatio is strongly positively related to ΔD and strong negatively related to ΔU.
Overall, the evidence in Panels C and D of Table 4 suggests that the guidance variables, in particular ΔD, are related to aggregate earnings news, consistent with our predictions.
Because these are correlations we cannot infer the direction of causality. While our argument is that firm-level earnings guidance conveys information about aggregate earnings news, it could also be that aggregate economic news filters down to the firm level and is then reflected in managers' guidance decisions.
Our other main interest is in whether the guidance variables are associated with market returns. There is no evidence that either the guidance variables or the earnings news variables are correlated with market returns, whether measured using the CRSP equal-weighted index or the S&P 500; all of these correlations are small and insignificant. The fact that market returns are not related to aggregate earnings news measures is surprising in light of the strong firm-level relation (e.g., Kothari, 2001 ) although perhaps less so given the relatively weak relation between macroeconomic variables and stock returns in general (e.g., see Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2002 , and the references therein).
There are several possible explanations for why quarterly guidance numbers are not correlated with quarterly market returns. First, as we discuss in Section 2.2, recent evidence shows that while cash flow news drives most of the variation in firm-level returns, variation in expected returns explains most of the variation in market-level returns. Second, earnings guidance may have countervailing effects on market returns, as discussed in Section 2. 25 Third, aggregating guidance data for the entire quarter likely obscures informational effects. The evidence above suggests that the bulk of downward guidance -both in terms of quantity and informativeness -occurs in the last few weeks of the quarter. We next narrow the focus of our analysis to monthly data. 25 Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2005) find a significant negative relation between quarterly market returns and aggregate earnings news. There are at least two differences between our tests and those in . First, we cumulate quarterly returns over the three month period ending with the announcement month rather than cumulating returns over the three month fiscal period. Second, Kothari et al. have a longer time series of data, since they use only quarterly Compustat data for their earnings measures and do not examine earnings guidance.
Monthly data
Given the strong seasonality in these data, we estimate guidance "surprises" for each month as seasonal (third) differences in monthly versions of the same downward, neutral, and upward guidance measures as well as in the guidance ratio (i.e., we define the guidance 'surprises' in April as the April guidance variable minus the January guidance variable, etc.).
We then correlate these monthly guidance surprises with contemporaneous monthly market returns, measured as returns to the CRSP EW index. The results are generally weaker if we use a value-weighted index such as the CRSP VW index or the S&P 500.
We report the results of these analyses in Table 5 . We present results for the full period in Panel A and for the 1998-2003 subperiod in Panel B. The labels 1, 2, and 3 on the guidance variables denote guidance in months 1, 2, and 3 of our quarterly periods, where quarters are again defined such that the first month in the quarter is the second month of the calendar quarter, which corresponds to the fiscal quarter for these firms. For example, ΔD2 is the change in the fraction of downward guidance in month 2 of each quarter (i.e., in March, June, September or December).
The results in Table 5 , Panel A offer little support for the idea that guidance is associated with market returns. While monthly changes in both the guidance ratio and downward guidance are negatively related to returns, as predicted, none of the correlations is significant at the 10% level. Similarly, changes in upward guidance in months 2 and 3 are positively related to returns, but only two are significant and then only at the 10% level.
The correlations are larger and a bit more significant in Panel B. Looking at the overall quarterly returns first, changes in the guidance ratio and downward guidance are negatively related to quarterly returns while changes in positive guidance are positively related to quarterly returns. The correlations are only statistically significant, however, for month 3. When we look at the correlations between guidance and the monthly returns, the largest, most significant correlations are between month 3 guidance and returns in month 1, which is hard to interpret as evidence that guidance leads returns and more consistent with the argument that macro-level news drives returns which in turn drive guidance. The only other significant correlation is between downward guidance in month 1 and returns in month 2.
Overall, there is weak evidence that monthly changes in guidance and market returns are associated and the evidence that does exist suggests that causality is more likely to run from returns to guidance than from guidance to returns. The results offer little support for the prediction that changes in monthly guidance drive monthly market returns.
Good and Bad News Quarters
The foregoing analysis requires us to make relatively strong assumptions about how to measure innovations in aggregate guidance. A priori, it is not obvious how to aggregate guidance, whether to use quarterly or monthly changes, or even how to measure the changes (as raw changes, percentage changes, seasonal changes, deflated by total guidance, etc.). 26 As an alternative, Figure 5 plots cumulative equal-weighted market returns for good and bad news quarters, where the classification is based on the sign of the cumulative quarterly return (results are similar using value-weighted market indices). Figure 5 shows that market returns evolve differently in good and bad news quarters.
While positive returns in good news quarters accrue smoothly and consistently over the period, negative returns in bad news quarters are concentrated in the last three weeks of the fiscal 26 Note, however, that we have measured the guidance changes in a number of ways, and the results are fairly stable.
quarter, when downward guidance tends to be released. These patterns support the idea that guidance affects monthly returns although the reverse causality argument may also hold.
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The apparent association between guidance and returns is reinforced by Figures 6 and 7 , which plot two measures of the timing and relative extent of downward guidance in good and bad news quarters (defined in the same way as in Figure 5 ). Figure 6 reports the cumulative (through each trading day) ratio of downward guidance to total guidance while Figure 7 plots the average daily number of downward forecasts. These figures show that: (1) there is, both in relative and absolute terms, more downward guidance in bad news quarters than in good news quarters, and (2) the timing of downward guidance is consistent with the stock return pattern, in that the larger relative extent of downward guidance in bad news quarters is clearly established about three weeks before the end of the quarters, and persists through the end of the fiscal quarter. We interpret these patterns as evidence of a link between guidance and market returns.
Market "Bellwethers"
To this point we examine the relation between earnings guidance and market returns using aggregates. An alternative approach is to see whether earnings guidance released by individual firms affects market returns in short windows around its release. To conduct this analysis, we sort all firms that issue quarterly earnings guidance in a particular quarter by size, measured by market capitalization, and retain the largest 20 firms in each quarter. These are our candidate "bellwether" stocks.
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To assess whether guidance issued by these firms affects market returns, we calculate correlations between the earnings news conveyed by their guidance and market returns in a 3-day announcement window. We use two measures of earnings news: (1) the difference between the earnings forecast and analysts' consensus immediately before the forecast (available only when the guidance is quantitative), and (2) the sign of the guidance, as previously defined, available for all observations (downward, neutral, and upward guidance, coded as -1, 0, and 1, respectively). The return is the three-day cumulative market return, centered on the day the guidance is released. For purposes of comparison, we also report correlations between the earnings news variables and the firm's own raw return for the same three day window. We report Pearson correlations, with p-values in parentheses, in Table 6 .
As expected, the earnings guidance variables are both positively related to contemporaneous own-firm returns, and both correlations are highly significant. The correlation is twice as large (.4 versus .2) for qualitative guidance as for quantitative guidance, which suggests more measurement error in the latter variable. 29 Our main focus, however, is on the market return correlations. We find that market returns are uncorrelated with firm-level quantitative guidance but that there is a positive and statistically significant relation between qualitative guidance and market returns (given the firm-level return results, we attribute the lack of correlation with the quantitative guidance to measurement error). Although the correlations are small, we see them as economically significant given: (1) the myriad other factors that affect market returns, and (2) the fact that the explanatory power of this guidance is comparable to that obtained from more conventional firm-level "short window" earnings response regressions.
30 29 The Pearson correlation of .4 indicates that the qualitative surprise explains 16% of the three-day return while that for the quantitative measure explains only 4%. These numbers are comparable to those of short-window earnings announcement studies that use firm-level data (e.g., Brown et al., 1987) which typically report R-squareds of around 5-10%. 30 There are two potential concerns with these tests. First, if announcement windows overlap to any significant degree, the associated dependence could lead to overstated statistical significance. To address this, we have reperformed these analyses after removing overlapping return windows and continue to find that the correlations are statistically significant. Second, it is possible that part of the correlation is mechanically induced because the return of the firm releasing the forecast is also included in the market return. Because these are large firms, this is more This evidence is consistent with the notion that earnings guidance is informative at the market level.
Summary and Implications
We investigate whether aggregate earnings guidance is informative with respect to aggregate earnings news and stock returns. First, we find that over the last decade or so, earnings guidance has become increasingly pervasive. Guidance is now issued by around 30%
of Compustat firms by number and by over half of Compustat on a value-weighted basis. There is an increasing tendency for these firms to provide guidance in conjunction with earnings announcements.
Second, we find that measures of aggregate guidance, especially relative levels of quarterly downward guidance, capture aggregate quarterly earnings news. Because earnings guidance is, by construction, issued before earnings news is available, this suggests that aggregate earnings guidance is potentially informative with respect to market returns. We find mixed evidence on this. We find little evidence of a relation between aggregate guidance and quarterly or monthly market returns. We do, however, find systematic differences in the intraquarter pattern of market returns between good news and bad news quarters, which appear to reflect systematic differences in the timing and nature of aggregate earnings guidance. We also find that firm-level earnings guidance is associated with market returns in short windows around its release, again consistent with guidance having market-wide effects. In summary, our tests provide some evidence that aggregate returns and earnings guidance are associated. They do not, likely to be a concern for the value-weighted indices and so the fact that our results are similar for the equalweighted index mitigates this concern. In addition, we have recomputed the correlation with the NASDAQ index after removing the NASDAQ firms, which removes the possibility that the correlation could be mechanically induced. The correlation falls from .08 to .06 (significant only at 10%), indicating that part of the correlation could be mechanically induced.
however, establish causality -one plausible alternative is that macroeconomic news drives market returns and earnings guidance, rather than guidance leading returns.
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Overall, we view our evidence as opening a potentially informative avenue in disclosure research. While a large literature examines various aspects of disclosure practice at the firm level, we know relatively little about disclosure's larger effects on the macroeconomy. Our research provides some evidence along these lines, but much remains to be done.
31 Researchers in finance have had a surprisingly difficult time documenting a relation between stock returns and macroeconomic variables such as industrial production and GNP (e.g., Chen, Roll, and Ross, 1986; Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2002) . Thus, it may not be too surprising that we do not find strong evidence in favor of a relation between aggregate earnings guidance and stock returns.
Appendix. Thomson/First Call (First Call) Management Forecast Data.
This appendix describes: (1) the evolution of First Call as a source of management earnings forecast data, (2) how we categorize the First Call sample into point forecasts, range forecasts, minimum and maximum forecasts, and qualitative forecasts; and (3) how we use this information in combination with First Call forecast data to classify the forecasts into those that convey upward, neutral and downward guidance.
First Call as a source of management forecast data
Based on our discussions with other researchers who use First Call data on management earnings forecasts, the evolution of First Call as a provider of management forecast data is as follows. First Call started out as a proprietary database for the dissemination of sell-side analyst research, including sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts, recommendations, etc., as well as related material such as transcripts of management's meetings with analysts, including conference calls. In the early years of its existence (the early 1990s) the collection of management earnings forecasts was not the primary goal of the service, which had a greater emphasis on sell-side data. After some years, however, First Call realized that management forecast data were also of interest to its customers. At this point, which we understand was around 1998, the company began compiling management forecast data more systematically.
Thus, it may be that the increase in forecasts evident in 1998 is due to an increased collection effort and/or an expansion of coverage.
We also believe that because First Call is primarily interested in collecting information generated by sell-side analysts, it is more likely to collect management forecasts for firms for which there is analyst coverage. As a result, its coverage for firms for which there is little or no analyst coverage may be incomplete.
In summary, it seems likely that First Call is not likely to include all management earnings forecasts for all firms (its coverage is likely to be more complete for firms with greater analyst following) and that its coverage is likely to have expanded over time, most notably in
1998.
2. Classification of forecasts into point forecasts, range forecasts, minimum and maximum forecasts, and qualitative forecasts: This is based on the FC "CIG code" (these are the numbers and letters indicated below), the existence of numerical estimates (non-missing "est_1" and/or "est_2"), and the FC "comment" field. 
Classification of forecasts into downward, upward and neutral surprises.
The classification is based on the sign of the management forecast surprise ("SURP"), defined as the difference between the new expectation and the prevailing median FC analysts' earnings forecast. We define upward guidance as SURP > 0, downward guidance as SURP < 0, and neutral guidance as SURP = 0. The determination of whether a forecast represents upward, downward or neutral guidance depends on the type of forecast, as detailed below. Table reports the number of observations in each cell, the mean market-adjusted return, the median market-adjusted return (in parentheses), and the fraction of negative market-adjusted returns. Market adjusted-returns are cumulated over the three trading days centered on the forecast announcement date and are calculated using the return on the CRSP equal-weighted index to measure the market return. Inv. ΔEP_agg = The time series innovation in ΔEP_agg assuming this series follows an AR1 process. Inv. ΔEP_agg = The time series innovation in ΔEP_ew assuming this series follows an AR1 process. ΔDown = the first difference in the fraction of forecasts of quarterly earnings that convey downward guidance about earnings for a given calendar quarter, defined as forecasts made in the second and third months of the calendar quarter and in the first month of the next calendar quarter (so that we include preannouncements that occur after the fiscal period end). We exclude forecasts made concurrent with earnings announcements. ΔNeut. = the first difference in the fraction of forecasts of quarterly earnings that convey neutral guidance about earnings for a given calendar quarter, defined as forecasts made in the second and third months of the calendar quarter and in the first month of the next calendar quarter (so that we include preannouncements that occur after the fiscal period end). We exclude forecasts made concurrent with earnings announcements. ΔUp = the first difference in the fraction of forecasts of quarterly earnings that convey upward guidance about earnings for a given calendar quarter, defined as forecasts made in the second and third months of the calendar quarter and in the first month of the next calendar quarter (so that we include preannouncements that occur after the fiscal period end). We exclude forecasts made concurrent with earnings announcements. Ratio is the ratio of the number of forecasts of quarterly earnings that convey downward guidance about earnings for a given calendar quarter to the corresponding number of forecasts that provide upward guidance. ΔRatio is the logarithmic seasonal change in Ratio (the natural logarithm of Ratio in quarter t to Ratio in quarter t-4). Equal-weighted return = the CRSP equal-weighted market return for the quarter, defined as the second and third months of the calendar quarter and the first month of the next calendar quarter. The quarterly return is the return on the CRSP equal-weighted market portfolio for each quarter, defined as the second and third months of each calendar quarter and the first month of the next calendar quarter. Return for month 1 is the return on the CRSP equal-weighted market portfolio for the first month of this quarterly period (the second month of each calendar quarter), return for month 2 is the return on the CRSP equal-weighted market portfolio for the second month of this quarterly period (the third month of each calendar quarter), return for month 3 is the return on the CRSP equal-weighted market portfolio for the third month of this quarterly period (the first month of the next calendar quarter).
ΔRatio1 is the change in the ratio of downward guidance to upward guidance from three quarters prior (seasonal difference) for the first month in the quarter (second month of the calendar quarter), ΔRatio2 is the change in the ratio of downward guidance to upward guidance from three quarters prior for the second month in the quarter (third month of the calendar quarter), ΔRatio3 is the change in the ratio of downward guidance to upward guidance from three quarters prior for the third month in the quarter (first month of the next calendar quarter). ΔD1 is the change in the fraction of guidance that is downward from three quarters prior for the first month in the quarter, ΔD2 is the change in the fraction of guidance that is downward from three quarters prior for the second month in the quarter, ΔD3 is the change in the fraction of guidance that is downward from three quarters prior for the third month in the quarter. ΔN1, ΔN2, ΔN3 are defined analogously for neutral guidance. ΔU1, ΔU2, ΔU3 are defined analogously for upward guidance. All changes are defined as logarithmic changes. The guidance variables are, in the case of quantitative guidance, the difference between the management forecast of earnings and the First Call consensus analyst immediately before the forecast date, and, in the case of qualitative guidance, an indicator coded 1 for upward guidance, 0 for neutral guidance, and -1 for downward guidance. Returns are firm-level raw returns and market returns cumulated over the three day window. To obtain the sample, we include the largest 20 firms (by market capitalization) that release quarterly guidance in each quarter during the sample period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) that also have available data. * (**) indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level under two-tailed tests.
